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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
￿ The access-to finance-problem for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is not universal in the EU, but is significant
in some parts of Europe, in particular the southern euro-area countries. 
￿ Southern euro-area members face a number of structural challenges and there are good reasons for the fall in credit aggre-
gates and higher lending spreads, such as necessary deleveraging, higher credit risk, the low productivity of SMEs and the
weak position of banks, which is reinforced by the deep recession and the ‘doom-loop’ connecting banks and sovereigns.
￿ Possible market failures, high unemployment and the risk that the possible worsening of the situation poses for Europe
(including the risk to the integrity of the euro area) make giving SMEs greater and easier access to finance a top priority.
￿ Up to now, the various European programmes for SME financing have reached only a tiny fraction of SMEs. Access to finance
for SMEs, especially in southern euro-area members, has continued to deteriorate despite these European initiatives. Step-
ping-up the allocated resources, while certainly beneficial, is unlikely to achieve a major breakthrough.
￿ Without repairing bank balance sheets and resuming economic growth, targeted initiatives to help SMEs gain access to
finance will have limited success. Banks with weak balance sheets tend to lend less. Continued weak economic conditions
will increase credit risk, thereby reducing both demand for credit by SMEs and the willingness of banks to offer credit at rea-
sonable rates to SMEs.
￿ There are three main targeted options to improve SME financing conditions: (1) more direct lending by public institutions,
such as the European Investment Bank, or public guarantees for lending by commercial banks, (2) enhanced securitisation
of SME loans through either guarantees or European Central Bank asset purchases, and (3) long-term central bank funding
at a low interest rate conditional on the expansion of net lending. These options are not mutually exclusive and could be
applied simultaneously.
￿ A general problem of all publicly-supported options is that they may create incentives for banks to extend credit to less
viable SMEs and lead to a Japanese-style scenario by distorting capital allocation.
￿ More EIB lending targeted at SMEs can be justified especially in the current environment in which banks face difficulties in
supplying credit. But EIB lending has limitations and much more capital should be provided to the EIB than the €10 billion
agreed last year.
￿ Securitisation of SME loans and their placement with private investors can help offload these loans from bank balance
sheets, thereby providing room for more lending. But this market is not functioning at the moment: while securitisation of
SME loans is already reasonably widespread in Italy and Spain, as almost none of the recent securitisations were placed with
market investors, but instead they were retained by the originator banks and used for repo refinancing with the ECB. Most
likely, the risk/return/liquidity characteristics of such securities are not attractive to investors.
￿ Public support for securitisation (eg in the form of guarantees) would either leave most of the risk with the banks (if the
bank retains the most-junior tranche of the bundled security), or would load more risk onto the public sector accounts,
which could be undesirable and also limit the scope for such support. Public support for securitisation does not address the
problem of high bank funding costs in southern Europe.
￿ A decision on the ECB taking on more credit risk through purchases of securities backed by SME loans should be based on
compelling evidence that such risk-taking by the ECB will greatly benefit SMEs. The benefits for southern Europe are unclear
while banks have weak balance sheets and face high financing costs, and SME loans are risky because of the dreadful eco-
nomic situation.
￿ SME loan securitisation practically does not exist in the United States, yet US SME financing has become more available since
late 2009, probably due to the early clean-up of the banks and effective growth policies.
￿ A properly designed scheme for targeted central bank lending for several years, on the condition that banks increase their
net lending to SMEs, can leave the credit risk with the banks, and also help banks’ to meet the Basel III stable net funding
ratio requirements.
￿ All three main options to support SMEs access to finance should be explored, but the discussion should not hinder the
recognition that banking clean-up and economic growth promotion are the best tools to foster SME access to finance. The
ECB should foster bank clean-up and recapitalisation by performing in the toughest possible way the asset quality review
before its takeover of the single supervisory role. 
￿ While an even more expansionary ECB monetary policy by itself will not solve the growth problem, but could contribute to
the revival of economic growth.03
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1.  According to the Euro-
pean Commission’s Small
Business Act for Europe
(SBA) Fact Sheets 2012,
SMEs accounted for 99.8
percent of the number of
businesses, 67.4 percent of
employment and 58.1 per-
cent of GDP in the European
Union in 2011. In Greece,
Italy, Spain and Portugal,
the share of SMEs in
employment ranges
between 75.6 and 85.2 per-
cent and the share of SMEs
in valued added ranges
between 65.7 and 70.2 per-
cent, well above the EU
average. In contrast, in Ger-
many and especially in the
United Kingdom, the role of
SMEs is well below the EU
average. See
http://ec.europa.eu/enter-
prise/policies/sme/facts-
figures-analysis/performan
ce-review/.
SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES (SMEs)
play a major role in the European economy and
especially in southern euro-area countries1 –
countries that face mounting challenges in achiev-
ing sustainable public and private debt positions,
sound banking systems and improved competi-
tiveness in the midst of a deep economic contrac-
tion and high unemployment, which are also
fuelled by major structural weaknesses.
Access to finance for SMEs deteriorated in several
countries after the crisis, as recorded by the OECD
(2013), particularly as a result of higher interest
rates and greater demand for collateral. The dete-
rioration was more significant in the hard-hit coun-
tries of southern Europe (Box 1).
There is an intense discussion in the European
Union on redoubling efforts to make it easier for
SMEs to have more wide ranging access to
finance. For example, the European Commission
and the European Investment Bank submitted a
report to the European Council of 27-28 June 2013
on options for increasing lending to the economy,
with a focus on SMEs (see European Commission
and European Investment Bank, 2013b).
This Policy Contribution assesses the rationale for
targeted European-level support for SMEs, and the
various options, focusing on broader design
issues and the possible role of the European
Central Bank.
1 SHOULD EUROPEAN SCHEMES TO SUPPORT
SMES’ ACCESS TO FINANCE BE REVAMPED?
While SMEs play a dominant role in the EU
economy and there are clear signs of limitations
to credit supply in some countries, the answer to
the question raised in the title of this section is not
an unambiguous ‘yes’. There are several reasons
why there may not be a need for a special new
European effort:
￿ Lack of sufficient access to finance for SMEs is
not a systematic problem in the EU, and not
even in the euro area. As noted in Box 1, there
does not seem to be a problem with access to
credit in Germany and Austria, and the same
can be said about some other better-suited EU
countries. An EU-wide response is definitely
needed when there is systemic market failure
in the EU, such as the paralysis in financial mar-
kets after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008. But when a problem is
regional, its causes should be well understood
before European-level initiatives are pursued.
￿ In most southern euro-area countries, where
SMEs face severe limitations in accessing
finance, there was too much credit before the
crisis and most likely a number of companies
accumulated excessive debt. Therefore, a fall
in the outstanding amount of credit can be an
indication of the necessary deleveraging
process.
￿ These southern euro-area countries have very
bleak economic outlooks, due to their structural
weaknesses, their weak price competitiveness,
which significantly deteriorated before the
crisis and has not improved sufficiently since,
their still-vulnerable public sector fiscal posi-
tions which require further fiscal consolidation,
and their banking sector weaknesses, which
are reinforced by the weak economic outlook
and the vulnerable public financial accounts
(see Darvas, 2012b). This implies that credit
risk must be higher in these countries than in
economies with better outlooks, such as Ger-
many. Consequently, the lending rate to SMEs
should also be higher in southern Europe than
in Germany.
￿ Small companies form a considerably larger
share of total firms in southern Europe than in
other member states. But SMEs are less pro-
ductive than larger companies (see Gill, Raiser
and others, 2012), which is particularly true in
the southern euro members. Therefore, limita-04
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￿ Finally, but related to the third point above, the
banking system has been seriously weakened
by the deep recession and also by the ‘doom-
loop’ connecting banks and sovereigns, with
weak banks exposed to their weak sovereigns.
In the deep recession marked by high unem-
ployment, the share of non-performing loans
continues to increase, which erodes banks’
capacity to take on new risks and supply credit.
At the same time, during the crisis, banks in
southern Europe even increased their exposure
to their sovereigns (Merler and Pisani-Ferry,
2012), intensifying their vulnerability and
strengthening the ‘doom-loop’. Under such cir-
cumstances, banks might not be able to supply
tions to credit supply might in fact help a ‘cre-
ative destruction’ of less viable companies and
the survival of better companies, which might
then start to grow, also drawing resources from
the ashes of the failed firms. Thereby, in the
medium/long-term, a healthier company struc-
ture may emerge, especially if the process is
enhanced by structural reforms in product and
labour markets.
￿ Targeted financing schemes may lead to ‘zomb-
ification’, as argued by Deutsche Bank (2013)
and Moec (2013), whereby firms with weak
productivity receive financing. This would drain
resources from the healthier part of the econ-
omy and entrench the weak growth potential.
BOX 1: CREDIT CONSTRAINTS
One, rather imperfect, indication of credit constraints is the evolution of the volume and cost of bank
loans. While no reliable time series is available for SME loans, the charts the appendix show that total
credit to non-financial corporations is typically falling in southern Europe. At the same time, the rates
charged on smaller loans are higher in southern Europe (eg 4.4 percent in Italy, 5.4 percent in Spain
and 6.6 percent in Portugal in May 2013) than, for instance, in Germany (3.0 percent), France (2.9
percent), Finland (2.8 percent), Austria (2.3 percent) and Belgium (2.1 percent) (see the appendix
for all EU countries).
However, we argue that the fall in credit aggregates and the higher-than-German interest rates can be
justified (at least to some extent) by the specific circumstances of southern European countries,
and therefore it is difficult to draw a conclusion from credit aggregates and lending rates. But the
recent survey by the European Central Bank (2013) suggests that there could be obstacles to credit
supply in some euro-area countries. While 85 percent of German SMEs and between 72 and 79 per-
cent of Austrian, Finish and French SMEs were granted the full amount of credit they requested during
October 2012 – March 2013, the ratio is much smaller in the following countries: 25 percent in Greece,
57 percent in Italy, 32 percent in Ireland, 46 percent in the Netherlands, 55 percent in Portugal and
40 percent in Spain.
The ECB also calculates an indicator called ‘financing obstacles for SMEs’, which is the sum of the
percentages of SMEs reporting loan applications that were rejected, loan applications for which only
a limited amount was granted, loan applications that were dropped by the SME because the borrow-
ing cost was too high, and the percentage of SMEs that did not apply for a loan for fear of rejection.
The share of SMEs reporting such financial obstacles ranges between 51 percent and 64 percent in
Greece, Ireland and Spain and between 31 and 46 percent in Portugal, Italy and the Netherlands. In
contrast, the share of financially constrained SMEs is 9 percent in Germany, 14 percent in Austria
and 18 percent in Finland. Yet SME profitability is much weaker in southern Europe and in Ireland
than in Germany, Austria and Finland (Chart 2 of ECB, 2013) and hence it is not clear-cut if the reason
for the financing obstacles faced by SMEs primarily stem from their poor economic performance or
from major limitations to credit supply. Weak profitability and financing obstacles could reinforce
each other: inadequate access to finance reduces profitability, thereby increasing non-performing
loans and contributing to deterioration of banks’ balance sheets, which in turn reduces the banks’
ability to supply credit. The Netherlands looks like an outlier, because SME profitability is not as weak
as in southern Europe, but there are similar financing obstacles.05
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2. The number of SMEs in
the six largest EU countries
is: France 2.5 million, Ger-
many 2.1 million, Italy 3.9
million, Poland 1.5 million,
Spain 2.5 million and United
Kingdom 1.6 million.
3. For most countries, data
for 2011 is also available in
OECD (2013).
4. The aggregate number for
the EU overstates the prob-
lem, because there does not
seem be a major issue with
SME financing in, for exam-
ple, Germany, Austria and
Finland. Also, not all SMEs
wish to get credit. However,
in three EU countries more
than half of SMEs faced
financial obstacles, and in
three other countries the
ratio is between one-third
and one-half (Box 1). This
suggests that the number of
SMEs facing financial diffi-
culties is very high.
much new credit, even if they are involved in
certain publicly-funded schemes to foster SME
lending.
However, while these arguments bring into ques-
tion the suitability of targeted European schemes
to improve access to finance for SMEs, especially
in southern Europe, there are some powerful rea-
sons why this should remain the top priority:
￿ Asymmetric information can lead to credit
rationing and suboptimal lending to SMEs.
Banks might find it difficult to assess the credit-
worthiness of SMEs, especially start-ups, and
may lend primarily against collateral, and not
based on assessments of expected returns
(OECD, 2013; Kraemer-Eis et al, 2010). This
problem lies at the heart of publicly-designed
schemes for SME financing and might have
become more entrenched during the crisis
because banks’ risk aversion has increased.
Indeed, as OECD (2013) argues, greater
demand for collateral was a major reason for
the deterioration of SME access to finance.
Therefore, because of this market failure, there
is a rationale for scaling up public support
schemes for SMEs at a time of recession. Since
the hardest-hit countries in Europe do not have
sufficient fiscal space for such programmes,
there is a case for European action.
￿ The unemployment rate in southern Europe
has reached such a high level that decisive
action is needed to improve the employment
situation. Since SMEs account for a very large
share of employment, there is a need for tar-
geted support to SMEs. Again, lack of domestic
resources justifies the European approach.
￿ Difficulties in accessing finance might not only
destroy non-viable firms, but might also stunt
the growth of more creative firms. Even if viable
firms obtain credit, but at a too-high interest
rate, their profitability declines and a negative
feedback loop between high financing cost and
declining profitability can arise.
￿ There are major externalities emanating from
the hard-hit euro-area countries to other euro-
area members and beyond (Darvas, 2012b).
Beyond the direct negative economic impacts
through trade and financial linkages from the
struggling southern members to other coun-
tries, there is also the major danger for the
integrity of the euro. The deepening economic
contraction in southern euro-area member
states is the most pressing issue threatening
the integrity, even the existence, of the euro. A
continued increase in unemployment in certain
southern European countries may lead to the
collapse of governments, political paralysis,
and an eventual disorderly exit from the euro
area. That would be dramatic not only for the
exiting country, but for the euro area as a whole
and even beyond. 
We therefore conclude that improving access to
finance for SMEs has to be a priority at the Euro-
pean level, but any scheme should consider the
deeper causes of the problem.
2 THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEM
There were almost 22 million SMEs in Europe in
2010, according to Eurostat2. Obtaining data on
the outstanding stock of SME loans is more diffi-
cult, because there is no comparable database.
We used OECD (2013), which presents data on
SME loans in 14 EU countries in 20103, along with
data from the European Central Bank, to estimate
the total stock in the EU. We found that SME loan
stock in the EU amounted to about €1.7 trillion in
2010 (Box 2 details the calculations).
The sheer number of SMEs and loans to them
makes it practically impossible for publicly-
funded initiatives to reach a sizeable share of
SMEs4. For example, European Commission
(2013), based on European Commission and
European Investment Bank (2013a), lists the
main results of existing European support
programmes for SMEs:
￿ Competitiveness and Innovation Framework
Programme (CIP), 2007-12:
￿ SME guarantee facility (SMEG) helped
nearly 220,000 European SMEs to access
over €13.3 billion in loans;
￿ The high growth and innovative SME facility
(GIF) funded investments in venture capital
funds, which provided more than €2.3 billion
in support to 250 fast growing SMEs;
￿ EIB Group support for SMEs reached €13 billion
in 2012, by supporting directly or indirectly
more than 200,000 SMEs.06
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5. There was also a large
number of national
initiatives for supporting
SMEs, such as increased
amounts of government
loan guarantees, special
guarantees and loans for
start-ups, increased
government export
guarantees, government co-
financing, increased direct
lending to SMEs, subsidised
interest rates, venture
capital and equity funding
and guarantees, business
advice, tax exemptions and
deferments and credit
mediation (source: Table
2.8 of OECD, 2013).
6. A correction was needed,
because the ECB data on
loans to non-financial cor-
porations was in most
cases somewhat smaller
than the OECD data for total
business loans, ie the ratio
of ECB data to OECD data is
86 percent for France, 87
percent for Hungary, 81 per-
cent for Italy, 100 percent
for Portugal, 100 percent for
Slovakia, 101 percent for
Slovenia and 90 percent for
United Kingdom. For Ireland,
the same ratio is 248 per-
cent, because the OECD –
correctly – removed loans
for financial intermediation
and property. For simplicity,
for the 17 countries for
which the OECD does not
report data for the stock of
total business loans, we
assumed that their stock is
10 percent higher than the
data on loans to non-finan-
cial corporations reported
by the ECB.
While these initiatives are undoubtedly important
and have achieved a number of positive results,
their financing has reached just a tiny fraction of
SMEs even if more than half of SMEs do not require
credit. Access to finance for SMEs, especially in
southern euro-area members, has continued to
deteriorate in recent years despite these Euro-
pean initiatives5.
Because of the large number of SMEs and their
huge loan stock, any publicly designed support
scheme would be unable to reach a sufficiently
large share of SMEs. The most ambitious option
put forward by the European Commission and
European Investment Bank (2013) aims to reach
1 million SMEs (about 5 percent of all EU SMEs)
using €10.4 billion of public funds to mobilise
€100 billion in SME loans (ie about 6 percent of
the outstanding SME loans). These are
respectable targets and if successfully imple-
mented, could help several companies, but still
only a small fraction of SMEs, get access to
finance. Furthermore, it is always unclear if pub-
licly funded programmes reach those SMEs that
face financing difficulties, or those SMEs that have
better fundamentals and get financing anyway.
Therefore, while publicly designed schemes
should be pursued, because they have the poten-
tial for improving the financing situation for a pro-
portion of SMEs, no miracles should be expected
and the underlying reasons for weak credit growth
have to be fully understood and addressed.
3 OPTIONS FOR HELPING SMES GET ACCESS TO
FINANCE
Before discussing the options, the main causes of
the access-to-finance problem need to be
understood.
BOX 2: THE STOCK OF SME LOANS IN THE EU IN 2010
There is no comparable database on the credit stock of SMEs for all EU countries. OECD (2013) devel-
oped a scoreboard for the financing of SMEs and entrepreneurs for 23 countries (of which 14 from the
EU) and reports either the stock of SME loans or the amount of new loans for SMEs. Stock data is avail-
able for nine countries: France, Ireland, Italy, Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and the
United Kingdom. The flow data is available for four further countries: the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland and Spain. For the Netherlands total data for business loans is available for the stock, but for
SMEs, only the flow. 
OECD (2013) reports data up to 2011, but there are some missing values for 2011, while the dataset
for 2010 is complete. Therefore, we use 2010 data.
When estimating the stock of SME loans in the EU, we used the stock data for the nine countries for
which this data is available: they add up to €765 billion.
For the four EU countries for which only the flow data is available, we calculated the average share of
new SME loans in total business loans during 2008-10 (earlier data is not available) and multiplied
with this average share the corrected outstanding amount of loans to non-financial corporations as
reported by the ECB6. Thereby, we estimated the outstanding amount of SME loans in these four coun-
tries (the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland and Spain) to be €394 billion.
For the remaining 14 EU countries (we did not include Croatia), we approximated the volume of busi-
ness loans by assuming that the share of SME loans in total business loans is identical to the share
in those 13 countries for which we have either stock or flow data on SME loans (which is 27 percent)
and again we used corrected ECB data on loans to non-financial corporations. This approximation
suggests €537 billion for SME loans in these 14 EU countries.
Altogether, we estimate the stock of SME loans in the 27 countries of the EU in 2010 to be €1,695 bil-
lion, or €1.7 trillion.
The largest stocks of SME loans were in Spain (€356bn), followed by Germany (€270bn), Italy
(€206bn), France (€201bn) and the United Kingdom (€131bn).07
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7. We focus on banks,
because banks have a
dominant role in financing
the European economy, in
contrast to the United
States where debt
securities markets have a
more significant role. There
has been only a very
limited reduction in the
reliance on banks in Europe
since the onset of the global
financial and economic
crisis (Darvas, 2013).
Furthermore, SMEs are
typically too small to issue
debt securities and
therefore depend very
much on loan financing
(from banks or other
financial intermediaries,
such as leasing
companies).
8. Among the biggest UK
banks, HSBC and Standard
Chartered do not participate
in the FLS. Barclays and
Nationwide Building Society
participate and increased
their outstanding stock of
loans by 3.6 percent and
3.1 percent, respectively,
between June 2012 and
March 2013.
‘It is difficult to assess the magnitude of Europe’s banking problems, because the first two
coordinated stress tests were discredited almost immediately by major bank failures, and new
stress tests have been delayed.’
The main reasons for weak credit performance in
the EU
There are two major and interrelated reasons for
the weak credit performance in some parts of EU,
in particular in southern Europe: impaired bank
balance sheets and the recession and bleak eco-
nomic outlook7. Banks that have dubious claims
on their balance sheet are less willing to take new
risks by lending to new firms. A recession deterio-
rates bank claims, and thereby reduces banks’
appetite for new lending, especially for those
banks that have weak capital positions.
The most recent UK example is instructive. Forty
banks participated in the UK’s Funding for Lend-
ing Scheme (FLS, see next section), of which 27
increased their net lending. The three largest par-
ticipating banks, Lloyds, Royal Bank of Scotland
and Santander, which incidentally have major cap-
ital shortfalls, reduced their net lending to the pri-
vate sector between 30 June 2012 and 31 March
20138. Without these three banks, the outstand-
ing stock of loans by the other 37 banks (ie the 27
banks that increased net lending and the 10 other
banks that reduced their net lending) increased
by 3.4 percent in the same period. A coincidence
between capital shortfalls and reduced lending
activities does not prove a causal relationship, but
it is telling.
The Japanese example of the 1990s is also a
warning signal for Europe. Caballero, Hoshi and
Kashyap (2008) argued that Japanese banks
feared writing down their claims, which became
dubious after large stock and land price declines
that began in the early 1990s, because that would
have reduced their capital below mandatory
levels. Instead, banks rolled over dubious claims
“gambling that somehow these firms would
recover or that the government would bail them
out”. The Japanese government also pushed
banks to lend more and there was a substantial
increase in the prevalence of firms receiving sub-
sidised loans compared to the pre-1990 period.
Nominal lending rates to corporates fell signifi-
cantly, and to a lesser extent real interest rates as
well, yet Japan entered a lost decade. Caballero,
Hoshi and Kashyap (2008) concluded that misdi-
rected bank lending played a major role in pro-
longing the Japanese macroeconomic stagnation
and limited access to finance for more viable
firms.
It is difficult to assess the magnitude of Europe’s
banking problems, because the first two coordi-
nated stress tests carried out by, respectively, the
Committee of European Banking Supervisors in
2010 and the European Banking Authority in
2011, were discredited almost immediately by
major bank failures and new stress tests have
been delayed. Yet bank credit default swap (CDS)
spreads suggest that there are still major banking
problems in Europe (Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Five-year credit default swap spreads
(CDS) of the ﬁve largest banks in selected
countries, 1 January 2008 – 26 June 2013
Source: Bruegel using data from Datastream.
Note: Simple average of the data of the five largest banks in
each country. The following banks are considered: Italy: Uni-
credit, Unione di Banche Italiane, Banco Popolare, Intensa San-
paolo, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena. Spain: Banco
Santander, BBVA, Banco Popular Espanol, CaixaBank, Caja de
Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid. France: BNP Paribas,
Credit Agricole, Dexia Credit Local de France, Societe Generale,
Natixis. Germany: Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, HypoVere-
insbank, Bayerische Landesbank, Norddeutsche Landesbank.
UK: HSBC, Standard Chartered, Barclays, Lloyds, Royal Bank
of Scotland. US: Wells Fargo, Citigroup, Bank of America, PNC
financial services, BB&T.08
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Therefore, repairing bank balance sheets, by forc-
ing banks to properly restructure dubious claims
and raise more capital, is a major precondition for
the resumption of healthy credit flows (see
Darvas, Pisani-Ferry and Wolff, 2013). The Euro-
pean Central Bank can foster the bank balance
sheet cleaning-up process by performing in the
toughest possible way the asset quality review,
which is scheduled before the ECB takes over the
single supervisory role.
Similarly, beyond addressing bank balance
sheets, effective efforts are needed to kick-start
EU economic growth, including a more adequate
approach to fiscal policy and an even more expan-
sionary monetary policy. Undoubtedly, more mon-
etary easing in itself would not solve the euro
area’s growth problem, but since inflationary
expectations are well below the two percent
target, there would be room for more monetary
easing in the midst of a lingering euro-area reces-
sion, and it would also help intra-euro rebalancing
(Darvas, 2012a). The structural reform agenda,
which is at the centre of the EU’s growth strategy,
remains vital, but will not contribute much to the
revival of economic growth at a time when private
demand remains weak.
Targeted options for fostering credit to SMEs
In our view, any targeted initiatives to help SMEs
get access to finance will have limited impact with-
out major progress on repairing bank balance
sheets and resuming economic growth. When this
happens, normal lending will also likely resume,
including to SMEs, and therefore additional tar-
geted options to help SMEs get access to finance
would not be needed. But there is a non-zero prob-
ability that the bank clean-up will not be impecca-
ble. For example, the ECB might take a cautious
approach to the asset quality review, if a weak
bank under examination would not be able to
obtain the required capital from private sources,
the sovereign of the country in which the bank is
located faces major fiscal challenges and there is
no European fiscal backstop for directly recapital-
ising banks. Also, while bank clean-up is a major
precondition for the resumption of economic
growth, there will be in any case a long way to go
before robust growth resumes (Darvas, Pisani-
Ferry and Wolff, 2013).
The question is then which European initiative
would be best, even if its impact is limited, to help
viable SMEs get access to finance in the transition
period until bank balance sheets and the eco-
nomic outlook improves. (We also note that there
are various other initiatives aimed at improving
the regulatory environment for SMEs, their financ-
ing and more generally their business environ-
ments, which are generally important irrespective
of the acute crisis in some southern European
member states, see Box 4).
SMEs are typically too small to issue corporate
debt and therefore either debt financing (eg loans)
or equity financing (eg venture capital) can give
them greater access to finance. We focus on debt
financing from banks, though the main principles
apply to equity financing as well.
In order to slow down or reverse the decline in
credit aggregates and reduce lending rates when-
ever they are higher than what is implied by the
fundamentals of the business, three broad
options emerge:
1 Direct lending to SMEs, or loan guarantees, by
public entities, such as the EIB group, national
development banks or other institutions;
2 Promoting the securitisation of SME loans;
3 Supporting banks with cheap long-term
liquidity.
To some extent, all three options are being imple-
mented. The EIB and national development banks
have various schemes for supporting SMEs, and
the €10 billion increase in the EIB’s capital (which
was one element of the June 2012 European
‘Compact for Growth and Jobs’) will likely enhance
this role. The European Investment Fund (EIF, part
of the EIB Group) already guarantees certain
tranches of securitised SME loans. And the Euro-
pean Central Bank has twice provided cheap liq-
uidity with full allotment and with a maturity of
three years to banks using its revamped long-term
refinancing operations (LTRO).
Of the three options, we do not discuss in detail
the first. Generally, some support to SMEs by
public institutions, like the EIB, can be justified if it
is based on sound investment principles and the
effectiveness of the support measures is appro-09
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priately assessed. Such support is even more jus-
tified at a time of a deep crisis, when banks face
difficulties in supplying credit. Nevertheless,
public institutions do not have the resources to
significantly increase their involvement in the allo-
cation of funds to potential borrowers. The EIB
should receive much more capital than the €10
billion it received recently.
We concentrate on the two other options, which
also have direct relevance for the European Cen-
tral Bank. Securitisation of SME loans targets the
asset side of bank balance sheets by, for exam-
ple, fostering the sale of SME loan portfolios,
thereby providing space for new lending. Liquid-
ity provision targets the liability side of bank bal-
ance sheets, by providing cheap fixed interest rate
funding for several years, thereby helping banks
to grant new credit. These options could be applied
simultaneously.
Securitisation
There are two main types of securitisation based
on loans to SMEs. The first is the creation of a secu-
rity that can be sold to investors or used as collat-
eral by a bank to obtain liquidity in repo markets.
The second is bank borrowing collateralised by
loans to SMEs, ie the issuance of a covered bond
backed by SME loans. According to Standard &
Poor’s (2013), the first such covered bond
issuance in the EU was announced in Germany in
20129 and they expect that issuances of such
covered bonds will gain popularity in the years
ahead.
But here we focus on standard SME loan securiti-
sation. 
Kraemer-Eis et al(2010) and Jobst (2008) pres-
ent nice overviews of securitisation. Essentially,
SME loan securitisation means bundling loans
(typically through a special purpose vehicle) into
a security, which is typically structured into vari-
ous tranches: senior, mezzanine and first loss10.
Even if the bank aims to sell the security, the first
9. Central banks purchased
a large share of Com-
merzbank’s SME-backed
covered bonds, see:
http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2013-02-22/com-
merzbank-s-debut-sme-
covered-bonds-get-central-
bank-support.html.
10. The mezzanine tranche
is subordinated to the
senior trance, but ranks
senior to the first loss
tranche. Sometimes there
are more than three
tranches (Moody’s, 2013).
An alternative way to secu-
ritise SME loans is the so
called ‘synthetic securitisa-
tion’, where traditional
securitisation techniques
are combined with credit
derivatives (see Kraemer-
Eis et al, 2010).
11. According to Banca de
Italia’s Financial Stability
Report April 2013, Italian
banks had abundant free
collateral and “at the end of
February banks would have
been able, if necessary, to
draw an additional €302
billion on the credit granted
by the Eurosystem”. For
Spain we could not find
such calculations, but the
fact that the reliance of
Spanish banks on Eurosys-
tem lending declined by
about €165 billion from
August 2012 to May 2013
suggests that they may be
able to raise a similar
amount again if they
wanted to. According to the
Banco de Portugal, “...it
should be noted that the
banks still have eligible
assets which are not
included in the pool and ref-
erence should also be
made to their capacity to
generate additional collat-
eral based on loans and
advances to customers.”
‘Public institutions do not have the resources to significantly increase their involvement in the
allocation of funds to potential borrowers. The European Investment Bank should receive much
more capital than the €10 billion it received recently.’
loss tranche is typically retained by the originator
bank and only the senior and mezzanine tranches
are sold.
￿ A bank could use securitised SME loans for the
following purposes:
￿ Keep (some or all tranches of it) and use it as
collateral with the central bank or in private
repo markets;
￿ Sell (some or all tranches of it) to private
parties;
￿ Sell (some or all tranches of it) to the central
bank.
Public support would not seem to be needed in the
first case. As we report in Box 3, SME loan securi-
tisation continues to be reasonably widespread in
Italy and Spain and these securities can be used
in ECB repo operations. Furthermore, there does
not seem to be an issue with the availability of col-
lateral, at least for Italy, Spain and Portugal11.
In order to increase the use of securitised SME
loans as collateral at the ECB, the applied haircut
could be reduced. However, in that case, either the
ECB faces a higher risk, or another institution, such
as the EIB, has to offer guarantees. But since the
availability of collateral does not seem to be a
major issue, a reduction in the haircut might not
stimulate much bank lending to SMEs.
The second purpose of securitisation, offloading
SME loans from bank balance sheets by selling
them to private investors, offers a number of
advantages, such as economic and regulatory
capital relief for banks. Kraemer-Eis et al (2010)
therefore argue that securitisation should have a
pivotal role in SME financing in Europe. It can help
banks raise finance by selling the security, which
can be important for those banks (or other finan-
cial intermediaries, like leasing firms) that have
limited access to capital markets, or for smaller
banks that face lending restrictions due to their
size. SME loans are among banks’ least liquid
assets and therefore SME loan securitisation can
help banks better allocate their assets.10
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BOX 3: SME LOAN SECURITISATION TRENDS IN EUROPE
Table 1 looks at securitisation in Europe and its composition according to different types. At the end of the first quarter of 2013, the
outstanding amount of securities backed by loans to SMEs was €154 billion. Given that we estimated the total stock of loans to SMEs
as €1.7 trillion in 2010 (Box 2) and since then (most likely) there has been a decline, approximately 10 percent of SME loans are secu-
ritised. But securitisation is very uneven within Europe. SME loan securitisation is highest in Spain (€53 billion) and Italy (€35 billion),
which jointly account for almost 60 percent of SME securitisation in Europe. Considering again that the provision of loans to SMEs has
likely declined since 2010, SME loan securitisation is probably more than 20 percent of outstanding stock in Italy and Spain. 
Unfortunately, country-level data on SME security issuances is avail-
able only for 2010Q3 onwards (quarterly frequency), but for Europe
as a whole, annual data on issuances is available for a longer period
(Figure 2). Figure 2 suggests that the growth of this market stopped
after 2007 and there have been some setbacks and volatility since
then. But SME securitisation continued rapidly even during 2011-12,
when the euro-crisis intensified, though almost all securities have
been retained by originator banks since 2009 and only a minority of
securities have been placed with the market. According to Kraemer-
Eis et al (2013), in the SME securitisation market, originators retain
newly issued deals mainly to create liquidity buffers and to use the
assets as collateral with central banks. The share of SME securitisation
in total securitisation is on the rise. By showing country-specific data
since 2010Q3, Figure 3 indicates that Italy and Spain continue to dom-
inate this market, though there has been volatility across quarters.
How much of the issuance was guaranteed by European and national
public institutions? The EIF annual report 2012 says “The guaranteed
volume of securitisation and covered bond tranches for the year
amounted to close to EUR 480m and supported SME lending volumes
of EUR 2.1bn”(European Investment Fund, 2013, page 24). There is
no indication of how this was distributed between securitisation and
covered bonds. If the full €2.1bn of supported loans was securitised,
it would compare with €45.2bn of SME securities issuances in Europe
in 2012. Therefore, in 2012 EIF guarantees played only a minor role
in supporting this market, perhaps because there was almost no
placement. Unfortunately, we could not collect data on possible
national or other public guarantee schemes for SME securitisation.
Table 1: Securitisation in Europe, outstanding stock in 2013Q1 (€ bns)
ABS CDO CMBS RMBS SME WBS TOTAL
Austria 0 2 2
Belgium 0 0 70 18 88
France 20 3 16 3 42
Germany 36 2 14 17 6 0 75
Greece 16 2 6 10 33
Ireland 0 0 0 46 0 47
Italy 53 4 10 95 35 1 198
Netherlands 5 2 3 258 9 277
Portugal 5 29 5 39
Russia 0 2 2
Spain 22 1 0 124 53 200
Turkey 2 2
UK 41 18 67 282 9 58 475
Other (1) 3 1 0 0 5
PanEurope (2) 4 32 17 0 5 0 58
Multinational (3) 1 102 2 1 1 107
European total 210 164 117 946 154 60 1652
Source: Table 2.7 from AFME (2013). Note: In the US, securitisation amounts to €6,702
billion. ABS: asset-backed securities. European ABS outstanding collateral types
include auto loans, credit cards, loans (consumer and student loans) and other. CDO:
Collateralised Debt Obligations denominated in a European currency, regardless of
country of collateral. CMBS: Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities. RMBS: Resi-
dential Mortgage Backed Securities. SME: Securities backed by Small- and Medium-
sized Enterprises. WBS: Whole Business Securitisation: a securitisation in which the
cash flows derive from the whole operating revenues generated by an entire busi-
ness or segmented part of a larger business. 1. ‘Other’ includes European countries
with outstanding securities that are too small to be displayed, such as Finland, Geor-
gia, Iceland, Ukraine, Switzerland, and Hungary. 2. Collateral from multiple European
countries is categorised under 'PanEurope' unless collateral is predominantly (over 90
percent) from one country. 3. Multinational includes all deals in which assets originate
from a variety of jurisdictions. This includes the majority of euro-denominated CDOs.
Figure 2: SME securitisation in Europe, issuance per year, 1999-
2012, and in the first quarter of 2013
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Figure 3: SME securitisation in Europe, issuance per quarter,
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The benefits that banks receive from securitisa-
tion can be channelled to SMEs in the form of more
or cheaper loans. Also, the replenishment features
of such securities allow banks to grant new loans
and include them in existing securities. An advan-
tage for investors is that they can get exposure to
SME loans, which otherwise would not be avail-
able. Jobst (2008) also note that structured secu-
ritisation, by offering tranches with different
risk/return properties, can help investors to select
the tranche that corresponds best to their risk pro-
file, eg pension funds may not buy from the most
junior first-loss tranche, but from a more senior
one.
However, Kraemer-Eis et al(2010) also argue that
because the bank typically continues to hold the
junior tranche of the security, “securitisation does
not transfer credit risk to third party investors but
is rather used for regulatory arbitrage in which the
originating bank merely exploits regulatory loop-
holes while most credit risk, except for maybe
some remote catastrophic portfolio loss risk, are
retained by the bank”(page 10).
In our view, on the question of public efforts being
stepped up to boost the issuance of such securi-
ties, the key issue is indeed related to the transfer
of risk. Unfortunately, European Commission and
EIB (2013) in their proposals for promoting SME
loan securitisation do not discuss to which
tranche(s) public guarantees would apply.
We have argued that credit risk related to SMEs is
higher in those countries in southern Europe that
face credit supply limitations. When there is no or
only a limited transfer of risk via securitisation
because the public guarantee applies to the mez-
zanine tranche (or even to a more senior tranche),
the bank’s risk profile does not greatly improve,
even if there is a decline in regulatory capital.
It is not clear if end-investors wish to have a major
risk exposure to the SME sector in southern
Europe, which is getting riskier. Moody’s (2013)
report that there was almost no credit rating down-
grade of securities backed by SME loans issued in
Belgium and the Netherlands and only minor
downgrades for German securities, but Italian and
especially Spanish securities suffered from major
downgrades. One reason for the Italian and Span-
ish downgrades is the severe economic recession.
This suggests that the perceived riskiness of Ital-
ian and Spanish securities increased significantly.
If public funds are used to enhance the securiti-
sation via, eg guaranteeing a more junior tranche,
then the question is the risk exposure of the public
institution. The public institution can charge a fee
for the guarantee, but if this fee is high enough to
compensate for the risk, then the attractiveness
of the guarantee is reduced12.
Furthermore, even if banks can offload their SME
loans via securitisation and are able to lend more
to SMEs, their lending rates will still be determined
by the funding cost. The bank funding cost from
private sources is much higher in southern Europe
than, for example, in Germany (as reflected by
high CDS spreads, see Figure 1, and by high
deposit rates, which have to be high to attract
depositors to banks that are perceived to have
weaker balance sheets than, eg German banks).
Therefore, if SME loans are funded from private
sources, lending rates will continue to be high in
southern Europe even if securitisation helps to get
rid of existing SME loans.
Fitch Ratings (2013) raises a different possible
obstacle to the successful use of SME loan secu-
ritisation in placing the securities with investors.
This obstacle is related to the risk/return/liquidity
characteristics of such securities: the spread
between SME lending rates and the yield investors
demand has to be sufficiently large, reflecting
market participants’ view of the risk profile of the
portfolio and the liquidity premium they require
for holding such securities (these markets are
rather illiquid now). This spread does not seem to
be high enough for existing SME loans, or for new
SME loans, in the main European jurisdictions. In
contrast, for retained SME-backed securities, the
asset spread can be lower (which explains why
there were sizeable SME loan securitisations in
Europe even recently, but almost all was retained
by the originator banks, see Box 3). Also, securiti-
sation of the loan obligations of larger companies
has started to pick up in Europe and the asset
spread of the underlying loans is much larger.
It is also notable that SME loan securitisation prac-
tically does not exist in the US13, yet SME financing
in the US has become easier since late 200914.
12. There is also a question
about the volume that the
public institution can guar-
antee, and the principles for
selecting the banks, espe-
cially if funds are not suffi-
cient to guarantee all
issuances.
13. Liu and Shao (2012)
report data on small busi-
ness loan securitisation in
the US. In each US state
apart from Utah, less than
half a percent of small busi-
ness loans are securitised.
In the US as a whole, the
peak of small business loan
securitisation was only
0.34 percent in 2007.
14. According to OECD
(2013), US data indicate
that the supply of credit to
small firms has steadily
recovered since the second
half of 2009, although by
2011 it had not reached the
peak level recorded at the
end of 2007. As far as
demand is concerned, a
lower percentage of small
firms are reporting that they
are borrowing, indicating
that some small firms, pre-
sumably the financially
weaker ones, have not re-
entered the credit markets,
even though small firms
that are regular borrowers
are concurring with bankers
that credit conditions have
indeed been steadily
improving.12
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The third possible use of securitisation, offloading
SME loans from bank balance sheets by selling
the securitised SME loans to the ECB, would offer
the benefits we have discussed at the cost of
increased credit risk for the ECB (if there is no
external guarantee, such as from the EIB). Such
moves could be motivated by the need to improve
monetary transmission, similar to the motivation
for the May 2010 Securities Market Programme
(SMP) and the September 2012 Outright Monetary
Transactions. In fact, the ECB has already con-
cluded two covered bond purchase programmes,
which also expose the central bank to credit risk.
However, a decision on the ECB taking on more
credit risk should be based on compelling evi-
dence that such risk taking will greatly benefit
SMEs. In our view, it is unclear how such risk-
taking by the ECB would benefit SMEs when banks
have weak capital positions and face high financ-
ing costs, and SME loans are risky because of the
dreadful economic situation in southern Europe.
Overall, enhancing SME loan securitisation via
public guarantees is an avenue to be explored, but
the case is not clear-cut, especially for SMEs in
troubled southern Europe, where there are more
fundamental causes holding back lending to
SMEs.
Long-term liquidity provision
In normal times, central banks do not provide long-
term liquidity to banks, primarily because it could
lead to moral hazard. The recent global financial
and economic crisis, and its aftermath in Europe,
has clearly been an exceptional period. The Euro-
pean Central Bank provided liquidity to banks with
full allotment for three years using the revamped
long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) in
December 2011 and February 2012. The Bank of
England, in cooperation with the UK Treasury,
launched the Funding for Lending scheme (FLS)
in July 2012, to provide cheap funding to banks
for up to four years, on the condition that banks
increase their net lending to the private sector
(households and private non-financial corpora-
tions). Both operations are backed with collateral.
Under the FLS, banks can obtain funding amount-
ing to 5 percent of their loan stock plus the amount
of their net new lending to the private sector. Since
most of the new lending was directed toward mort-
gages (which are generally safer than lending to
SMEs), in April 2013 the FLS was extended to
incentivise lending to SMEs, by giving banks
financing from the FLS equivalent to 10-times their
net new lending to SMEs (see Bank of England,
2013).
The cost for the LTRO is fixed at the main refinanc-
ing rate at the time, which was 1 percent. The
effective cost of the FLS varies from bank to bank,
due to its more complicated structure, yet Gold-
man Sachs (2012) estimated that for the UK bank-
ing system as a whole, the effective cost of the FLS
was about 1 percent per year, well below the fund-
ing cost of banks.
More recently, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB –
the central bank of Hungary) adopted a Funding
for Growth Scheme (FGS) in April 2013, which is
based on similar principles to the FLS, but is exclu-
sively designed for lending to SMEs. The MNB pro-
vides funding to banks at zero interest rate for up
to ten years (equal to the term of the loans to be
provided to SMEs), on the condition that banks
either increase their net lending to SMEs, or refi-
nance earlier loans (including foreign currency
loans) with cheap new loans15. The MNB also sets
the ceiling of 2.5 percent as the maximum lending
rate that banks can charge on loans funded from
the FGS (see Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 2013). This
margin is smaller than what banks’ typical charge
for SME loans, yet there was strong interest in the
scheme from banks, and, not surprisingly, there
is strong demand from SMEs for obtaining such
cheap loans, which are significantly below market
lending rates (see the appendix)16.
Too little time has passed since the launch of the
FLS to draw firm conclusions about its effective-
ness. Yet a clear result is the decline in bank fund-
ing costs and retail interest rates. Also, as we have
highlighted, 27 out of 40 banks that participate in
the scheme increased their net lending between
30 June 2012 and 31 March 2013. If we exclude
the three big banks (Lloyds, Royal Bank of Scot-
land and Santander) that have major capital short-
ages, then the aggregate net lending of the
remaining 37 banks (including ten smaller banks
that reduced their net lending) was increased by
3.4 percent from June 2012 to March 2013. New
15. New lending to SMEs
should be used exclusively
for financing investment,
investing in working capital,
or contributing to EU finan-
cial support. Thereby, the
MNB wants to exclude pos-
sible arbitrage, whereby
SMEs borrow at the 2.5 per-
cent rate from the new
scheme and purchase
much higher yielding gov-
ernment bonds.
16. We note that there could
be state aid issues over
such dedicated central
bank support to SMEs,
because a company not
receiving the aid may be
put at a competitive disad-
vantage and competition
within the single market
could be distorted. In March
2013, the European Com-
mission approved the FLS
(see the press release:
http://europa.eu/rapid/pres
s-release_IP-12-
244_en.htm), but to our
knowledge the April 2013
modification of the FLS and
the FLG of Hungary have not
yet been examined.  13
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lending largely concentrated on mortgages and
there are some encouraging signs from the hous-
ing market. In April 2013, house prices in England
and Wales topped the pre-credit crunch high and
in May 2013 gross mortgage lending was the high-
est since 200817. Certainly, the FLS was not the
only factor supporting housing markets, yet it
might have played a role.
The major question is if the ECB should consider a
scheme similar to the FLS/FGS. Banks’ funding
costs, especially in southern Europe, are still very
high, as reflected by the large CDS spreads (Figure
1) and deposit rates well above the deposit rates
offered by German banks. Therefore, obtaining
cheap long-term liquidity could incentivise bank
lending.
In order to select the most suitable instrument, it
is worth comparing the FLS/FGS with the LTRO and
the FLS/FGS with the enhancement of SME loan
securitisation.
The LTROs contributed, though only temporarily,
17. See the 14 and 20 June
2013 Financial Times
reports ‘House prices in
England and Wales top pre-
credit crunch high’ at
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/
s/0/0eeea7ac-d374-11e2-
95d4-
00144feab7de.html#axzz2
XwOigA4E and ‘Mortgage
lending soars as funding
initiatives lift housing
market’ at
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/
s/0/3fb1a4c8-d993-11e2-
98fa-
00144feab7de.html#axzz2
XwOigA4E.
18. See
http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/news/en/pressroom/con
tent/20130412BKG07195/
html/EU-Bank-Capital-
Requirements-Regulation-
and-Directive.
BOX 4: THE EUROPEAN ACTION PLAN
The action plan presented by the European Commission (2011) included several useful initiatives on
regulatory, financing and business environment aspects. The key regulatory measures are:
￿ Improving the regulatory framework for venture capital;
￿ Using/reviewing state aid rules to support SME access to finance (such as allowing aid to banks,
designing schemes to promote Europe 2020 objectives, altering the Risk Capital Guidelines for
the benefit of SMEs);
￿ Improving SME access to capital markets (by, for example, fostering more visible SME markets
though the Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments (MIFID) and more visible listed SMEs
through the modification of the Transparency Directive, reducing the reporting burdens for listed
SMEs);
￿ Reviewing the impact of bank capital requirements on SMEs (by considering appropriate measures
addressing the issue of SME risk weightings in the context of the CRD IV (Capital Requirements
Directive) and CRR (Capital Requirements Regulation) frameworks18);
￿ Accelerating the implementation of the Late Payments Directive;
￿ Designing an innovative regime for the European Social Entrepreneurship Fund.
There are also a number of plans for SME financing for the 2014-20 period:
￿ Measures to improve lending to SMEs (such as the Programme for the Competitiveness of Enter-
prises and SMEs (COSME)), including a Loan Guarantee Facility for debt financing and securitisa-
tion of SME loans; the Horizon 2020 programme, including a debt facility with an SME window to
support research and innovation; the Creative Europe Programme, including a Cultural and Cre-
ative Sectors Facility; and the EU Programme for Social Change and Innovation);
￿ Measures to improve access to venture capital and other risk financing (funded by COSME and
Horizon 2020).
Also, various other measures are foreseen to improve the business environment, such as better infor-
mation for SMEs and about SMEs, monitoring the SME lending market, stimulating cross-border invest-
ments and policy coordination.
The 2013 Annual Growth Survey also calls on governments to restore normal lending to the econ-
omy (see European Commission, 2012). The following priorities were set: 
￿ Promoting new sources of capital (business-to-business lending, corporate bonds, venture capital);
￿ Reducing late payment by public authorities, which currently creates particular burdens for SMEs;
￿ Developing the role of public banks and guarantee institutions in the financing of SMEs;
￿ Supporting public schemes, which allow banks to borrow at a lower rate if they increase their long-
term lending to businesses or provide cheaper and more accessible loans to SMEs;
￿ Ensuring a balanced approach to repossessions in case of mortgage lending.14
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to the stabilisation of Italian and Spanish govern-
ment bond markets (see Darvas and Savelin,
2012), which was a major achievement at that
time. But they did little to trigger lending to the pri-
vate sector. To a large extent, banks either
deposited the cheap central bank funding at the
ECB for rainy days, or purchased higher yielding
government bonds. Thereby, the LTROs in effect
supported liquidity, ensured stable long term (3-
year) financing, subsidised the banking system
and helped to restore profitability, and temporar-
ily supported distressed government bond mar-
kets. However, there is also a negative reading.
Belke (2012) and Pill (2013) argue that the LTROs
delayed the bank restructuring efforts and pro-
longed the existence of non-viable banks, with
major negative side effects.
An FLS/FGS-type scheme could be more instru-
mental in fostering credit growth than the LTRO in
the future, especially if central bank lending is
fully conditional on new lending19. And in Sep-
tember 2012, the ECB launched the new Outright
Monetary Transactions (see Darvas 2012c), which
is a powerful instrument for supporting distressed
euro-area sovereign bond markets, under appro-
priate conditions, and therefore there is no need
for supporting sovereigns via the backdoor of
banks. Therefore, should the ECB ever consider
again providing liquidity with maturity of several
years, an FLS/FGS-type scheme would be clearly
preferable compared to the design of the two ear-
lier 3-year LTROs. Since bank funding costs from
private sources in the troubled southern European
economies remain high and the new Basel III reg-
ulations, in particular, the net stable funding ratio
(NSFR), are likely to be particularly binding, long-
term central bank liquidity provision will likely
have a major role in the future as well.
On the question of FLS/FGS versus support for SME
loan securitisation, the key question is if the ECB
is willing to take credit risk onto its balance sheet
or if other EU institutions (like the EIB Group) are
ready and able to take on such risk. With a scheme
designed along the lines of the FLS/FLG, which
would essentially mean central bank lending
against collateral, the credit risk can be left with
the banks20. But with public support to increase
SME loan securitisation, either the ECB or the EIB,
has to take on the risk.
Our preference would be for the credit risk
assumed by the ECB to be minimised, especially
because there is a first-best solution to overcome
undue credit constraints: cleaning-up the balance
sheets of the banks and supporting economic
growth.
We should highlight that an FLS/FGS-type scheme
can have drawbacks. Banks could extend credit to
less viable SMEs and enter into a Japanese-style
scenario by distorting capital allocation. This could
be especially the case if SME lending is rewarded
by as much as the UK’s April 2013 revised FLS
scheme, in which banks can get £10 of new fund-
ing from the Bank of England for every extra £1 net
new loan they grant to SMEs. But when the central
bank funding is provided one-to-one for every € of
net new credit, then this concern is reduced. And
this potential drawback is not specific to central
bank liquidity provision: public support to SME
loan securitisation and direct lending by publicly-
owned investment banks (or public guarantees of
lending by commercial banks) also entail the risk
that banks extend credit to less viable firms.
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
While southern European countries have major
structural weaknesses that explain, at least in
part, their severe SME access-to-finance problem,
market failures and the high unemployment which
ultimately threatens the integrity of the euro make
a strong case for properly designed European sup-
port. There are arguments in favour of stepping-
up all three main options: lending by development
banks, public support for securitisation, and cen-
tral bank liquidity provision. All three options
should be explored to break the vicious circle
between the credit crunch and weak economic
conditions. However, more lending by develop-
ment banks has limitations. Public support for
securitisation could either leave most of the risk
with the banks, or might transfer substantial risk to
public accounts, which could be undesirable and
could limit the scope for such support. And secu-
ritisation does not address the problem of high
bank funding costs in southern Europe, and there
are questions over the risk/return/liquidity char-
acteristics of such securities. Cheap long-term liq-
uidity provision by central banks, especially if it is
fully conditional on expanding lending to SMEs,
19. Note that in the UK,
banks could borrow under
the FLS up to 5 percent of
their loan book, irrespective
of their net lending activity.
But when net lending
declines, the cost of the FLS
funding increases up to a
certain maximum.
20. As we have argued, at
least in Italy, Spain and Por-
tugal, banks have ample eli-
gible collateral and
therefore banks in these
countries should be able to
access ECB liquidity.15
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can be an effective tool to to alleviate the problem
of high bank funding cost and help banks comply
with the net stable funding ratio requirement of
Basel III. Only central banks can provide such
funding on a massive scale. Since central bank
funding is provided against collateral, the increase
in the risk exposure of the central bank would be
limited. 
However, our main conclusion is that without
repairing bank balance sheets and resuming eco-
nomic growth, targeted initiatives to help SMEs
gain access to finance will have limited success.
Cleaning-up bank balance sheet should be the top
priority and the European Central Bank should
foster this process by performing in the toughest
possible way the asset quality review ahead of its
takeover of the single supervisory role.
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APPENDIX: CREDIT AND INTEREST RATE DEVELOPMENT IN EU COUNTRIES
Specific time-series for SME loans are not available. The figure below shows data for all non-financial
corporations.
Figure 4: Credit to (all) non-financial corporations (in domestic currency unit, September 2008 =
100), January 2007 – May 2013
Source: Bruegel using data from the European Central Bank (outstanding stock of credit in euros) and Eurostat (exchange
rate against the euro at the last day of the month). Note: We converted the data published by the ECB in euros to national cur-
rencies. In those floating exchange rate countries in which foreign currency loans have a large share (Hungary, Poland, Roma-
nia), some of the changes are due to the revaluation, as exchange rates depreciated since 2008. The vertical line indicates
September 2008. Data for Croatia is not available.
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LithuaniaSpecific time-series for SME lending rates are not available. The figure below shows data for loans below
€1 million to all non-financial corporations.
Figure 5: Interest rate on loans below €1 million to non-financial corporations for less than one-year
maturity (percent per year), January 2007 – April 2013
Source: Eurostat except for the UK, for which is from the Bank of England. Note: UK data refers to loans below £1 million and
for all maturities. The vertical line indicates September 2008. Data for Croatia is not available.
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